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Abstract
This paper studies how morale in teams can break down. It interprets
high morale as team members working together productively, either be-
cause of a sense of fairness or because of implicit incentives from repeated
interactions. Team members learn that lay-offs will occur at a fixed future
date, which will eventually cause morale to break down.
The paper shows that the breakdown of morale can vary in size and
the equilibrium outcomes can be Pareto ranked. A firm’s measures to
encourage cooperation may actually hurt morale, by convincing oppor-
tunistic team members to imitate and later take advantage of cooperative
colleagues.
1 Introduction
1.1 The Issue
Managers are preoccupied with employee morale. They feel it is important for
productivity, but worry that high morale may be fragile. In particular, increased
turnover or a sense of unfairness may cause morale to break down. Managers
also worry that low morale can be contagious (Bewley 1999).
This paper examines a particular mechanism, based on these ideas, by which
morale may break down. I look at team production, and define high morale as
team members choosing to cooperate (work productively) rather than defect
(be opportunistic).
Team members are of two types. Altruists are concerned with fairness and
will cooperate if they expect others to do the same. Egoists only cooperate if
repeated team interactions provide implicit incentives for them to do so. Team
members have been working in a stationary environment where the incentives
from repeated interactions have sustained high morale. Altruists have not dis-
tinguished themselves from egoists, so team members only know their own type.
∗I would like to thank my supervisor Maarten Janssen, and seminar participants in Rot-
terdam, Amsterdam and Vienna for helpful comments.
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I consider what happens if team members unexpectedly learn that a one-
time shock, interpreted as lay-offs, will occur at a fixed future date. They more
heavily discount periods after the shock, which is large enough to eventually
cause egoist morale to break down. Low morale may spread from egoists to
altruists, who do not want to be taken advantage of by egoist partners.
An equilibrium always exists where morale breaks down completely, so where
players defect in all periods until the shock. Any cooperation is only possible
if altruists can reveal their type by cooperating in some period where egoists
defect.
A firm that makes cooperation sufficiently attractive can prevent any break-
down, but a smaller change may actually hurt morale. It encourages egoists
to imitate altruists and later take advantage of them, which can leave altruists
unable to reveal their type. As a result, all equilibrium cooperation can break
down.
1.2 Literature on Morale, Teams
Morale is an ambiguous notion, related to trust in colleagues, a willingness to
cooperate, a sense of common purpose and a belief that outcomes are fair. Little
empirical work has looked at how morale in firms may break down, perhaps
because firms are hesitant to make their problems public (Bewley 1999). But
there is evidence supporting this paper’s approach: to look at morale in self-
managed teams, and at the impact of both concerns for fairness and incentives
from repeated interactions.
Empirical work links high morale with high group performance, likely be-
cause it promotes cooperate behaviour (see for example Ryan et al. 1996).
Cooperation is important in teams, since interdependent tasks and a shared
responsibility for outcomes can otherwise make opportunism tempting (Alchian
and Demsetz 1972). It may be particularly important in self-managed teams,
where employers exert limited control.
Moreover, teams are now widely used in firms.1 Self-managed teams have
become particularly popular. Osterman (2000) reports that 40% of firms in the
United States had at least half of their core employees in self-managed teams in
1997, and the practice is widespread internationally.2
Intrinsic motivation, such as concerns for fairness, and implicit incentives
from repeated interactions can both explain why employees cooperate (Rotem-
berg 1994). Both reasons are compelling in the context of self-managed teams.
Intrinsic motivation may increase as people come to believe in common values
for their work based on fairness and identification with the team (Barker 1993).
Many teams also interact repeatedly and team members’ ability to discipline
each other makes reputation important (Burt 2005, Che and Yoo 2001, Rayo
2007, Kvaloy and Olsen 2006).
1A government survey (Kinsley et al. 2005) reports that 72% of firms in Great Britain had
at least some employees in formally designated teams in 2004.
2See Clegg et al. (2002) for Great Britain, Switzerland, Australia and Japan, and Wood
et al. (2004) again for Great Britain.
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This paper is related to the literature on team interactions and productiv-
ity. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) look at how binding contracts between
team members influence their relationship with the principal, and Kandel and
Lazear (1992) look at peer pressure between partners. Che and Yoo (2001) ex-
amine how repeated interactions affect a principal’s choice of joint performance
or relative performance evaluation, while Kvaloy and Olsen (2006) consider a
similar situation with only relational contracts. Rayo (2007) looks at repeated
interactions with cash transfers between team members.
This paper is different in that it looks at how incentives from repeated inter-
actions interact with concerns for fairness, and relates the whole to the concept
of morale. Among the above papers, it is also the only one to consider repeated
interactions in a non-stationary environment. This type of environment is rele-
vant since breakdowns in morale are often related to sudden changes in the state
of the world (Gibbons 1998, Levin 2002). Another difference is that I assume
all incentives come from repeated interactions between teams members in their
tasks.
The strategic situation in this paper bears similarities to the finitely re-
peated prisoners’ dilemma, which has been looked at extensively. Cooperation
may be possible due to group exclusion (Hirshlifer and Rassmusen 1989), Knigh-
tian uncertainty (James and Costa 1994), dependence between past actions and
current period pay-offs (Janssen et al. 1997), unilateral pre-game commitment
(Fa´ın˜a Med´ın et al. 1998), or rewarding pairs of players who outperform others
(Serrano and Zapater 1998).
This paper’s approach is most similar to Kreps et al. (1982), which considers
the effect of uncertainty about player rationality or preferences. Kreps et al.
look at mixed strategies, and show that the classic conclusion (no cooperation)
is not robust to the introduction of a small probability each player is an altruist.
This paper instead looks at symmetric pure strategy equilibria, and considers
how a firm’s policy decisions may affect the amount of cooperation.
1.3 What is Ahead
Section 2 describes the model, which involves an infinitely repeated game with
two types and a shock at a fixed future date. The stage game is a prisoners’
dilemma for egoists and a coordination game for altruists. I identify cooperation
with high morale, and show to what extent it is possible before the shock.
Section 3 shows there are three types of equilibrium outcomes, and they can
be Pareto ranked. The worst case is for morale to break down immediately
upon learning of the shock and to remain low. An intermediate case is similar
but altruist morale recovers at some point before the shock. The best case is for
altruist morale to stay high throughout, and for egoist morale to only drop at
some later time. It is only in this case that egoist morale does not immediately
drop, and low morale never spreads to altruists.
I then describe what drives these equilibrium results. A key point is that
cooperation is only possible if players eventually sort; altruists cooperate and
egoists defect in some period, allowing altruists to reveal their type and work
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with one another. If not, then egoists eventually defect because of the shock,
and altruists defect because of concern their partner is an egoist.
Seemingly reasonable steps a firm might take to help morale can be coun-
terproductive. Increasing the returns to successful cooperation or targeting the
lay-offs at those who defect can actually hurt morale. It decreases an egoist’s
incentive to sort, since he may prefer imitate an altruist and later defect against
him. That can cause a sorting equilibrium to break down, leaving only the worst
case outcome. On the other hand, giving players more flexibility about when
they can act and informing them well in advance of the lay-offs can help morale.
Section 4 shows the general results are robust in terms of renegotiation
proofness, different assumptions about rematching, and allowing for uncertainty
about the shock. Section 5 concludes, and points out a parallel with other types
of efficient groups that are unable to adjust to unexpected change.
2 The Model
2.1 Model Set-Up
There are a countably infinite number of players who differ only in type, θ ∈ Θ,
where Θ = {0, θ0}. Altruists have type θ = θ0 and egoists have θ = 0, with
θ0 > 0. Type is private information, and a fraction λ of players are altruists.
Players play an infinitely repeated game, in which they pair up into a team
in each period and collaborate on a productive task. Players learn at the start
of the game that an exogenous shock will occur after T0 periods, at which time
a randomly selected group of players will leave the game. A fraction δ0 < 1 of
players remain after period T0, so a low value of δ0 corresponds to a large shock.
Players whose partner has left the game randomly match up with each other
and play continues.
Players have a natural discount factor δ ≤ 1. They are uncertain to remain
in the game after period T0, so their effective discount factor looking forward to
periods after the shock is δδ0 < δ.
The following stage game gives the pay-offs for team production:
C D
C a+ θ, a+ θ c, b
D b, c d, d
The material incentives a, b, c and d represent a prisoners’ dilemma: b > a >
d > c, and 2a > b+ c.
Altruists are intrinsically motivated, receiving an extra pay-off θ0 > b − a
when their cooperation is reciprocated. Two altruists who knew each other’s
type would play a coordination game.
Players are randomly matched in the first period. Teams in which both
members choose the same action in a given period remain together for the
next period. All other teams break up, and these players are rematched into
pairs according to some exogenous mechanism. The only assumption about the
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mechanism is that all players who are believed to be altruists with probability
one are paired together.
I look for perfect Bayesian equilibria. Such equilibria consist of strategies
and beliefs, such that strategies are always optimal given beliefs and beliefs
follow from observed actions. Players have a common prior λ and they update
their beliefs using Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
2.2 Interpretation and Additional Assumptions
Players should be seen as employees working for a firm, with each pair working
as a self-managed team that operates autonomously from any principal. Morale
is high in a given period if players cooperate. Players can break up with their
partner and rematch if they are unhappy with their partner, which often seems
to be possible in self-managed teams (see for example Barker 1993).
The start of the formal game corresponds to players learning of the shock,
at which point they do not know each other’s type. The interpretation is that
players were working together before then with high morale, supported by in-
centives from repeated interactions, so nobody could infer each other’s type. In
that sense, the first period where players defect is when morale breaks down.
The initial matching is random because players have no reason to differentiate
between each other based on past play.
The material incentives give a prisoners’ dilemma because of the potential
for opportunism in teams. It corresponds to a particular situation with joint
production technology, group incentives and costly effort: productivity is 2d, 2b
or 2(b+ a− c) when nobody, one player or two players exert effort, each player
receives half his team’s production as pay-off and the cost of effort is (b− c).
The term θ0 in an altruist’s pay-off reflects a sense of fairness towards his
partner. He is intrinsically motivated to cooperate, but only if he expects his
partner to cooperate as well.
I only consider a subset of the potential perfect Bayesian equilibria. First,
I only look at symmetric pure strategy equilibria, where all players of the same
type take the same actions. Looking at symmetric pure strategy equilibria
simplifies the analysis and allows me to consider the two types of employees as
groups. I can then address how morale in one group affects morale in the other.
Second, I look for equilibrium with a certain amount of cooperation. Specif-
ically, I only consider equilibrium outcomes in which players cooperate when
they believe each other to be altruists with probability one, and in which all
players cooperate after the shock. I do not place any restriction on play off the
equilibrium path - in principle a player could punish a deviation by repeated
defection. The reason is that I am interested in the maximum amount of coop-
eration that can be sustained in equilibrium, despite uncertainty about player
type and the upcoming shock. I check the robustness of the results in Section
4 by applying renegotiation-proofness, which may restrict possible play off the
equilibrium path.
I use the one-stage deviation principle when looking for potentially profitable
deviations from any equilibrium. In any continuation game and for given beliefs,
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I only have to consider deviations in which a player changes his first stage action
and then conforms to his equilibrium strategy (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991).
Finally, I make two assumptions on parameters. The discount factor must
be large enough to support full cooperation if players did not expect a shock.
Condition 1 is:
δ ≥ b− a
b− d (1)
The shock must be large enough to cause an equilibrium in which players
always cooperate to break down. Otherwise, morale could simply remain high.
An egoist’s best deviation is to defect in the last period before the shock. He
obtains b in that period, and remains in the game with probability δ0. If he
remains he may be punished by repeated defection, which would give him d in
all later periods. In the equilibrium, the egoist would receive a in the period
before the shock, and also in all periods afterwards if he remains in the game.
The deviation is profitable if:
a+ δ0
δ
1− δ a < b+ δ0
δ
1− δ d
Condition 2 is therefore:
δ0 <
1− δ
δ
b− a
a− d (2)
Condition 1 implies that the upper bound on δ0 is less than one.
3 Model Analysis
Theorem 1 will describe what outcomes can be supported in equilibrium. The
outcomes can be Pareto ranked, and equilibria with higher morale only exist for
more restrictive parameter values.
I establish a number of lemmas which I use to formulate and prove Theorem
1. The first lemma shows that altruists cooperate at least as much as egoists in
any equilibrium.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, altruists cooperate in any period where egoists coop-
erate.
Proof. Altruists and egoists fully reveal their type as soon as they choose dif-
ferent actions. After revealing their type, egoists defect until the shock by
Condition 2 and by backwards induction. Before revealing their type, players
choose the same actions so altruists cannot defect in a period where egoists
cooperate. If players revealed their type by egoists cooperating and altruists
defecting, an egoist could improve his pay-off by defecting. He would obtain
b > a in that period and at least the equilibrium pay-off d in each later period.
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An egoist’s dominant strategy in the stage game is to defect. He will only
cooperate if he can increase his future pay-off by imitating an altruist.
The second lemma shows that strategies of a simple form can generate all
equilibrium outcomes. It is important to first distinguish between non-visible
and visible deviations.
For a particular equilibrium, a player’s deviation is non-visible if it fully
mimics the equilibrium actions of the other type. It is non-visible in the sense
that other players cannot infer that he is deviating. Rather, he appears to be
the other type playing his equilibrium strategy. Any other deviation is visible.
Players can punish someone who makes a visible deviation, but have no
reason to do so after a non-visible deviation. The lemma shows I can assume
players always respond the same way after any visible deviation.
Lemma 2. Consider any equilibrium outcome. It can be supported for arbitrary
out-of-equilibrium beliefs by strategies where players always defect after a visible
deviation.
Proof. Any subgame perfect equilibrium outcome can be supported by equi-
librium strategies that revert to the least attractive equilibrium play of the
subgame following a deviation (Abreu 1988). Here the least attractive equilib-
rium play in any continuation game is repeated mutual defection. That is the
case regardless of beliefs, since mutual defection is a Nash equilibrium of the
stage game for both types.
I now only consider strategies where players always defect after any visible
deviation. Doing so will be sufficient to find all possible equilibrium outcomes.
To fully specify each type’s strategy, I must also give actions on the equilib-
rium path for the first T0 periods, and after making a non-visible deviation.
With these strategies, a visible deviation can only be profitable if it provides an
immediate gain compared to the equilibrium outcome.
I call an equilibrium where altruists always take the same actions as egoists a
pooling equilibrium. Players could cooperate in all periods, defect in all periods,
or cooperate in some periods and defect in others. The third lemma shows there
is a unique pooling equilibrium.
Lemma 3. The only pooling equilibrium is for all players to defect in periods
1 through T0.
Proof. Any deviation is visible since players take the same equilibrium actions,
so the latter fully specify a strategy. It is an equilibrium, since cooperating in
any period reduces immediate pay-off by (d− c).
In any other pooling equilibrium, let t < T0 be the last period before the
shock where players cooperate. An egoist who defects in period t improves his
immediate pay-off by (b − a). Until the shock, he can do no worse than his
equilibrium pay-off d. He only suffers a punishment if he remains in the game
after the shock, receiving d instead of a in all later periods. The deviation is
profitable if:
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δt−1(b− a) > δ
T0
1− δ δ0(a− d)
The incentive to deviate is decreasing in t, and it is profitable for t = T0 by
Condition 2.
Lemma 3 implies any cooperation is only possible before the shock if play-
ers eventually sort. A sorting equilibrium is one where altruists take different
actions from egoists in some period. I say players sort in a given period, if that
is the first period where they reveal their type.
I look at sorting equilibria in the following way. I first assume players sort
in a given period and describe how they then must play until the shock. I then
show in what period players are willing to sort. Finally, I assume players sort
in one such period and describe what play is possible before then.
Lemma 4. Say players sort in period t. Then on the equilibrium path, altruists
cooperate and egoists defect in period t and in all subsequent periods until the
shock.
Off the equilibrium path, an altruist who defects in period t and in all periods
since then continues to defect until the shock. An egoist who cooperates in period
t and in all periods since then continues to cooperate until period T0, and then
defects.
Proof. The lemma specifies a strategy for each type as of period t, because it
gives actions on the equilibrium path and after any non-visible deviation.
Lemma 1 implies altruists cooperate and egoists defect in period t. Types
are then fully revealed, so by the assumption on matching altruists pair up with
each other. Altruists then cooperate until the shock because they know they are
working with fellow altruists, and egoists defect by the same logic as in Lemma
1.
An altruist who defects in period t and all subsequent periods is believed to
be an egoist, so his partner defects until the shock. Cooperating would decrease
his pay-off by (b− a) and make the deviation visible, so it is more profitable to
keep on defecting.
An egoist who cooperates in period t and subsequent periods is believed
to be an altruist, so his partner cooperates until the shock. He receives a in
all periods, then b in period T0 when he defects. That makes the deviation
visible, so he gets d in each period after the shock if he remains in the game.
Cooperating in period T0 would give him a in all these periods, which is less
profitable by Condition 2. First defecting before period T0 is also less profitable
by Condition 1.
Say players sort T ≡ T0 − t periods before the shock, so after t periods of
play. Lemma 4 implies that when looking for a profitable deviation in these last
8
T periods, it is sufficient to consider a one-stage deviation in the period where
players sort. That is, does either type have an incentive to change his action in
that period, and conform to his equilibrium strategy thereafter?
If the one-stage deviation is not profitable for a player of a certain type, I say
that type is willing to sort T periods before the shock. A sorting equilibrium
can only exist if altruists and egoists are willing to sort in the same period.
The following two lemmas describe when altruists and egoists are willing to
sort.
Lemma 5. Altruists are willing to sort T periods before the shock if and only
if Ta ≤ T , where Ta solves:
λb+ (1− λ)d− λ(a+ θ0)− (1− λ)c = δ1− δ (1− δ
T−1)(a+ θ0 − d) (3)
If no solution exists, then Ta =∞. An altruist’s incentive to sort is strictly
increasing in T .
Proof. From Lemma 4, an altruist’s equilibrium pay-off is:
λ(a+ θ0) + (1− λ)c+ δ1− δ (1− δ
T−1)(a+ θ0) + δ0
δT
1− δ (a+ θ0)
A one-stage deviation by defecting when players sort gives:
λb+ (1− λ)d+ δ
1− δ (1− δ
T−1)d+ δ0
δT
1− δ (a+ θ0)
Comparing the two expressions gives (3), which is easier to satisfy for larger
T .
An altruist’s equilibrium actions are to cooperate in all periods after sorting,
while his best deviation is to imitate an egoist and defect in all these periods.
The left-hand side of (3) gives an altruist’s immediate loss by sorting rather
than deviating, and the right-hand side gives his future gains. These future
gains are (a+ θ0−d) in all periods until the shock, so sorting is more attractive
when T is large.
If sorting actually gives an immediate gain, then altruists are willing to sort
for any T , so Ta = 1. That is the case when the left-hand side of (3) is negative.
They are unwilling to sort for any T if sorting gives an immediate loss that is
larger than even an infinite stream of future gains, so that Ta =∞. Otherwise,
there is a finite value of Ta > 1 such that altruists are only willing to sort if the
shock is at least T periods away.
The term δ0 does not appear in the altruist’s incentive constraint because
an altruist’s best deviation is non-visible. He will not be punished after the
shock, and will instead enjoy the equilibrium pay-off a in all these periods. An
altruist’s incentive to deviate therefore does not depend on the probability he
will leave the game.
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Lemma 6. Egoists are willing to sort T periods before the shock if and only if
T ≤ Te, where Te is the maximum of 1 and the solution to:
δ
1− δ (1−δ
T−1)(a−d)+δT−1(b−a)−δ0 δ
T
1− δ (a−d) = λb+(1−λ)d−λa−(1−λ)c
(4)
If no solution exists, then Te = ∞. An egoist’s incentive to sort is strictly
decreasing in T .
Proof. Again, Lemma 4 gives players’ equilibrium strategies as of T periods
before the shock. An egoist will always sort when T = 1, because defecting is
the dominant strategy of the stage game. If T ≥ 2, an egoist gets pay-off:
λb+ (1− λ)d+ δ
1− δ (1− δ
T−1)d+ δ0
δT
1− δ a
Cooperating when players sort gives:
λa+ (1− λ)c+ δ
1− δ (1− δ
T−1)a+ δT−1(b− a) + δ0 δ
T
1− δ d
Comparing the two expressions gives (4). It is more difficult to satisfy for
larger T if the following expression is negative:
(b− a)− δ
1− δ (a− d)(1 + δ0)
Plugging in δ0 = 0 and δ’s lower bound from Condition 1 shows that is the
case.
An egoist’s equilibrium actions are to defect in all periods after sorting, while
his best deviation is to imitate an altruist but defect in period T0.
The left-hand side of (4) gives an egoist’s immediate gain by sorting rather
than deviating, and the right-hand side gives his future losses when T ≥ 2. The
immediate gains are always positive since defecting is the dominant strategy of
the stage game, and losses are positive and increasing in T . Sorting is therefore
less attractive when T is large.
If the immediate gain from sorting is larger than an infinite stream of future
losses, then egoists are willing to sort for any T (so Te =∞). Otherwise, there
is a finite value of Te such that egoists are only willing to sort if the shock is at
most Te periods away.
Lemmas 5 and 6 imply sorting can occur T periods before the shock if and
only if:
Ta ≤ T ≤ Te (5)
The following lemma shows that Te is always at least as large as Ta. When
Ta is finite, a real number T will always exists that satisfies (5).
Lemma 7. Ta ≤ Te holds for all parameter values.
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Proof. See appendix
Players must pool in all periods before they sort, and Lemma 8 shows if it
is possible to pool on cooperation.
Lemma 8. Say players pool for t periods and then sort. Then no player has an
incentive to deviate before sorting if players always pool on defection, or if the
last period t′ ≤ t where players pool on cooperation satisfies:
λ ≥ 1
δt−t′+1(b− d) [(b− a)− δ0
δT0−t
′+1
1− δ (a− d)] (6)
Proof. Any deviation in the first t periods is observable since players are pooling.
The only deviation that increases immediate pay-off is for an egoist to defect
while all other players cooperate. Condition 1 implies the deviation is most
attractive in period t′. His equilibrium pay-off from then on is:
δt
′−1a+
δt
′
1− δ (1− δ
t′−t)d+ δt{λb+ (1− λ)d}+ δ
t+1
1− δ (1− δ
T0−t)d+ δ0
δT0
1− δ a
He gets a in period t′, d in the following periods until sorting, d after sorting
and until the shock, and then a in subsequent periods if he remains in the game.
His best deviation is to defect in period t′ and in all subsequent periods,
giving:
δt
′−1b+
δt
′
1− δ (1− δ
T0−t′+1)d+ δ0
δT0
1− δ d
Comparing the two expressions gives (6).
Lemma 8 shows that players can always defect before sorting. Cooperation is
only possible before sorting if the fraction of altruists exceeds a certain threshold.
If other players cooperate before sorting and λ is low, an egoist prefers to
defect in the last period where players cooperate. He is then punished and
receives only d instead of [λb+(1−λ)d] when sorting occurs, but these pay-offs
are similar when λ is low. Plugging the upper bound of δ0 into (6) shows that
the threshold is always positive.
The threshold depends on t′, the last period where players cooperate. It is
decreasing in t′, and so easiest to satisfy later in the game. Setting t′ = t in (6)
and using T ≡ T0− t, the condition for cooperation in all periods before sorting
is:
λ ≥ 1
δ(b− d) [(b− a)− δ0
δT+1
1− δ (a− d)] (7)
where the right-hand-side is less than one by Condition 1.
If it is possible to cooperate at all before sorting, then it is possible to
cooperate in all periods before sorting. This later case is most reasonable,
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as it is Pareto dominant and more intuitive than players switching between
cooperation and defection.
Combining the results from the lemmas gives Theorem 1, which shows what
outcomes can be supported by equilibrium strategies. All actions refers to the
first T0 periods of the game.
Theorem 1. An equilibrium always exists where players defect in all periods.
That is the only equilibrium if:
T0 < Ta
or if there is no integer T such that (5) holds:
Ta ≤ T ≤ Te
where Ta and Te are defined in Lemmas 5 and 6.
If instead T0 ≥ Ta and (5) holds for some T , then a second type of equilibrium
exists. Egoists defect in all periods, while altruists only cooperate in the last T
periods before the shock.
If λ is large enough so that (6) also holds, then a third type of equilibrium
exists. Players pool on either cooperation or defection in any of the first t′−1 <
T0 − T − 1 periods, and they cooperate in period t′. Egoists defect in all later
periods, while altruists only cooperate in the last T periods before the shock.
There are no other equilibria.
Proof. The proof follows from Lemmas 1-8.
I now consider only the most intuitive equilibrium of the third type, where
players always cooperate before sorting. I interpret the results in terms of
morale, and then describe what drives them.
The equilibrium outcomes can be Pareto ranked. The worst case for morale
is where all players defect until after the shock. Egoist morale drops upon
learning of the shock and low morale spreads immediately to altruists. Morale
then remains low until the shock. This equilibrium exists for all parameter
values.
An intermediate case is similar but where altruists return to cooperation
some time before the shock. Egoist morale drops immediately and low morale
spreads to altruists, but altruist morale recovers before the shock. These equi-
libria exist for certain parameter values.
The best case for morale is where altruists always cooperate, and egoists
initially cooperate but later begin to defect. Low egoist morale never spreads
to altruists, whose morale remains high throughout. These equilibria exist for
more restrictive parameter values.
If type were public information, altruist morale would always remain high
but egoist morale would drop immediately. Welfare would be higher than in the
first two cases but lower than in the third.
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3.1 What Drives the Equilibrium Results
Altruists can only sustain high morale if they know they will eventually be
able to identify one another. To do so, they must sort by cooperating in some
period where egoists defect, which reveals their type. Sorting may involve an
immediate loss compared to deviating, but yields future gains since altruists can
then cooperate with each other.
All morale will break down by backwards induction if altruists are never able
to sort. Altruists know egoist morale will be low in the last period before the
shock. Their own morale will also be low if they won’t sort, which ensures egoist
morale will also be low the period before. If altruists won’t sort then either,
egoist morale will drop even earlier. Working back implies egoist morale drops
in the first period, which causes altruist morale to drop as well.
If altruists are eventually able to identify each other, what happens to morale
depends on the fraction of altruists. As long as altruists cooperate, egoists
may be convinced to do the same to avoid revealing their type. Even then, it
may be profitable for an egoist to defect in the last period where all players
cooperate. He is punished when players sort, but the deviation is attractive if
his partner was most likely an egoist who would defect then anyway. In a sense,
egoist morale remains low because there are too few altruists to change their
behaviour.
If egoist morale immediately drops, altruists would like to sort by cooperat-
ing and keep their morale high. But cooperating when T > Te is so attractive
that some egoists would imitate and later take advantage of them. Altruist
morale therefore drops and remains low until T ≤ Te, then recovers as players
sort.
If there are enough altruists and they are eventually able to identify each
other, altruist morale can remain high the entire game. High altruist morale
keeps egoist morale high until players sort. Egoist morale then drops, and
altruists continue cooperating with one another.
3.2 Allowing For Flexbility
Morale may completely break down because players are unwilling to sort at the
start of any period, despite the fact that Ta < Te. If there is no integer between
Ta and Te, then any given period is either too early or too late to sort.
This section shows a complete breakdown can be avoided if players have
enough flexibility, in the sense of choosing actions more frequently. Intuition
suggests that if periods are sufficiently short, players will be able to sort between
time Ta and Te before the shock. That intuition does not turn out to be fully
correct, but an equilibrium will nonetheless exist where players cooperate.
To model flexibility, I scale down per period pay-offs by an integer M ≥ 1
and assume there are MT0 periods before the shock. Each period now has
length 1M , but the total time until the shock is unchanged. I assume actions are
revealed to other players time τ after they occur, with 0 < τ ≤ 1. It reduces to
the original model for M = 1, since then players can update their beliefs and
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act on them after each period.
For technical reasons, I only consider the case of δ close to 1. Intuitively,
the weight of pay-offs in one time interval compared to another should not
depend on M . For example, the total pay-off before the shock compared to the
total pay-off afterward should be independent of period length. Experimenting
shows this is not generally possible for geometric discounting, so I set δ = 1
when needed in the formal analysis. By continuity, the results will also hold for
δ close to one.
I first show that if τ is sufficiently small, increasing flexibility can stop morale
from breaking down at all.
Result 1. Say τ ≤ δ0 δ1−δ (a−d)(b−a) , and δ0 > 0. Then for M sufficiently large, an
equilibrium exists where players always cooperate.
Proof. Say τ ≤ 1M , so actions are revealed after each period. In that case, if
all players cooperate, an egoist does not have an incentive to defect in the last
period before the shock if:
b− a
M
− δ0 δ1− δ (a− d) ≤ 0
That reduces to 1M ≤ δ0 δ1−δ a−db−a , which can hold if τ ≤ δ0 δ1−δ a−db−a
As long as each period is longer than τ , increasing flexibility reduces an
egoist’s incentive to defect in the last period before the shock. He can then
only take advantage of his partner for a shorter time before his defection is
discovered. If some players remain in the game after the shock and τ is small
enough, then sufficiently flexibility makes egoists willing to cooperate.
If each period is shorter than τ , increasing flexibility does not change this
incentive. Regardless of period length, he can only take advantage of his partner
for time τ .
If τ is too small to permit full cooperation, then increasing flexibility can
still help players sort. They will not do so between time Ta and Te before the
shock, but only later in the game.
Result 2. Say T > Ta and Te ≥ 2, but there is no integer between Ta and
Te. Then for all M such that τ < 1M , no sorting equilibrium exists. For M
sufficiently large, an equilibrium exists in which players sort between time τTa
and τTe before the shock.
Proof. See appendix
Increasing flexibility does not help players sort as long as each period is longer
than τ . Players can choose actions more often, but egoists are only willing to
sort later in the game because they can take advantage of their partner for a
shorter time. The proof shows that sorting is only possible between time TaM and
Te
M before the shock. As M increases, the interval begins at a later point in the
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game and it also becomes smaller. If there is no integer T with Ta ≤ T ≤ Te,
then players are still unwilling to sort in any period.
If each period is shorter than τ , actions are always revealed approximately
time τ after they occur. Increasing M does not change this, so players are still
willing to sort between time Taτ and Teτ before the shock. For sufficiently high
M , some period will begin within this interval.
3.3 Policy - Reducing the Size of the Breakdown
Interpreting the shock as lay-offs, what can the firm do to favour high morale?
A sufficiently large change in material pay-offs that makes cooperation more
attractive can prevent any breakdown from occurring at all. That is, making
(b − a) small enough compared to (a− d) will violate Condition 2, so that full
cooperation becomes an equilibrium.
If such a large change is not possible, the firm can try to minimize the size
of the breakdown. To do so it wants player to sort, which implies both Ta ≤ T
and T ≤ Te in some period, with Ta and Te defined in (3) and (4). It also
wants players to cooperate before sorting, for which (7) must hold. A change in
parameters will only have an unambiguous positive effect on morale if it helps
with at least one incentive constraint without hurting any of the others. That
is, it decreases Ta, increases Te, or loosens (7).
Changing the material rewards a, b, c, or d tends to have an ambiguous ef-
fect on morale. Sorting involves cooperation from altruists and defection from
egoists, so increasing the incentive to sort for one type tends to decrease the
incentive to sort for the other. Looking at (3) and (4), there is no change to
any of these parameters that always helps morale, or that always hurts.
In particular, two seemingly reasonable steps by a firm to help morale can
be counterproductive. The first is a small increase in a, the returns to successful
cooperation. The second is to make a rule that links lay-offs to performance,
such that players who defect are more likely to be laid-off. Both changes make
cooperation more attractive, but they can cause all equilibrium cooperation
before the shock to break down. The reason is that they may prevent sorting.
Theorem 2. Say θ0 is small. Then pay-off parameters a, b, c and d exist such
that there is an equilibrium with some cooperation, but either of the following
changes leaves all players defecting as the unique equilibrium:
(i) there is a marginal increase in a
(ii) δ0 is sufficiently small, and a player only leaves the game after the shock
if all players who have defected in strictly more periods than him also leave the
game.
Proof. See appendix
Both of these changes are too small to convince egoists to always cooperate.
The condition on δ0 in (ii) means an egoist will likely leave the game regardless
of his actions, so the rule increases his incentive to cooperate only slightly.
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Equilibrium cooperation is still only possible if employees sort, and egoists are
now less willing to do so.
The idea in the proof is to choose parameters such that egoists are indifferent
about sorting in some period. When θ0 is small, egoists and altruists have similar
pay-offs so the critical values Ta and Te are close to one another. Sorting is only
possible in the period where egoists are indifferent, and each change gives them
a strictly positive incentive to deviate.
The parameters used to prove Theorem 2 are not unique: d is unspecified,
and c may take on any one of (T0 − 1) possible values. I can also replace each
parameter by another one within a small neighbourhood, and the results will
still hold for a slightly larger increase in a. The proof considers the standard
model with period length 1, but the argument also holds for any strictly positive
period length.
Theorem 2 bears some similarities to results from the literature on intrinsic
motivation and crowding out. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) show large mon-
etary rewards often improve behaviour, but small rewards may actually hurt.
One explanation is that offering money can ruin the signaling effect of a cer-
tain action, by encouraging people who are just motivated by monetary rewards
(Janssen and Mendys 2004). Although the mechanism in this paper is different,
the problem is still that a small increases in material compensation can encour-
age lower types to take a positive action (cooperating), which can prevent higher
types from taking that action in equilibrium.
Rather than changing pay-off parameters, the firm can help morale by giving
employees more flexibility to react to the shock. Increased flexibility, in the sense
of choosing actions more frequently, can help in two different ways. If employees
can observe each other’s actions quickly enough, then flexibility means they can
only be taken advantage of for a short time. Morale can then stay high because
egoists never defect. If not, then increasing flexibility can still help morale by
allowing sorting. When periods are sufficiently short, employees are able to sort
right at the moment when both types are willing to do so.
The firm may also prevent a complete breakdown of morale by informing
employees of the lay-offs well in advance. If T0 < Ta, then morale breaks down
because there is not enough potential future cooperation to convince altruists
to reveal their type. That need not be the case if the firm informs employees
at least time Ta before lay-offs occur. Still, informing employees earlier may
be risky. If there is no integer between Ta and Te, then employees will still be
unwilling to sort. Morale will break down immediately, and now it will remain
low for longer.
The size of the shock and the fraction of altruists are not factors the firm
can easily control, but they do both affect morale. A smaller shock is better for
morale, but only because it affects egoist behaviour. An egoist is more willing
to sort, because he will likely to remain with the firm and can be punished
for a deviation. In contrast, the size of the shock has no effect on an altruist’s
incentive to sort. An altruist’s best deviation involves perfectly mimicking egoist
equilibrium actions. He not punished because nobody realizes he has actually
deviated.
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A larger fraction of altruists may actually have a negative effect on morale.
More altruists means that more employees cooperate during sorting. That in-
creases an altruist’s incentive to sort, since he is less likely to be taken advantage
of. If b − d > a − c, then it also increases an egoist’s incentive to sort. The
condition means there are no strategic complementarities in terms of material
pay-offs. Egoists are more willing to defect when they think their partner will
cooperate, which favours sorting. But if there are such strategic complemen-
tarities, an increase in the fraction of altruists increases an egoist’s incentive to
cooperate, which may leave him unwilling to sort.
4 Robustness and Extensions
4.1 Renegotiation-Proofness
The results of Theorem 1 are general in the sense of holding for arbitrary out-of-
equilibrium beliefs. The strategies involve punishments that are always formally
credible, but they do not always seem equally reasonable. Two players off the
equilibrium path who believe each other to be altruists with a high probability
are supposed to defect, but they might well renegotiate to mutual cooperation.
I address the point by showing that a renegotiation-proof equilibrium exists
for some out-of-equilibrium beliefs, provided a condition on parameter values
holds. In this equilibrium, players play as efficiently as possible after every
history given that they must do so in future periods as well.
The renegotiation-proof equilibrium outcome will be one of the equilibrium
outcomes from Theorem 1, where the particular outcome depends on parameter
values. Theorem 1 shows that different equilibria exist for different parameter
values, but outcomes of existing equilibria can always be Pareto ranked. For
any given parameters, the renegotiation-proof equilibrium will give the Pareto
dominant outcome of the existing equilibria.
I am interested in play before the shock, so I apply the standard notion
of renegotiation-proofness in a finitely repeated game, Pareto perfection (Bern-
heim et al. 1987), to play in the first T0 periods. In this context, an equilibrium
is renegotiation-proof if it satisfies the following criteria after any history ht.
Players play an equilibrium of the stage game in period T0 that is Pareto effi-
cient, taking into account the period T0 + 1 continuation pay-off. They choose
actions in period T0 − 1 that are supported by the period T0 continuation pay-
offs, taking into account possible restrictions on period T0 play. The period
T0 − 1 actions give a Pareto efficient outcome to the last two periods of play,
given the possible restrictions. Players choose actions in period T0 − 2 that are
supported by the continuation pay-offs in period T0− 1 and that are efficient as
above, and so on back to period t.
Let ht be an arbitrary history, with T periods left until the shock. The
history ht implies a certain belief µi about each player i = 1, 2, 3 . . .. Beliefs
about different players may differ, and they need not correspond to the prior λ.
Consider the outcomes that can be supported as perfect Bayesian equilibria
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in the continuation game following ht, by pure symmetric strategies. Here
symmetric means players of the same type and facing an identical strategic
situation take the same action. There is at least one such outcome, where any
team i, j with µi = µj = 1 cooperates and any other team defects.
Define RPS, a renegotiation proof strategy, in the following way. When re-
stricted to the continuation game following ht, RPS picks out one such outcome
that is Pareto efficient, and this for any ht.
Lemma 9. Say there are T periods left before the shock. RPS will have any
player i and his partner defect regardless of type if µi < µTa , where:
µTa ≡
d− c− δ1−δ (1− δT−1)(a+ θ0 − d)
a+ θ0 + d− b− c
Proof. See appendix
In the general game, an altruist is unwilling to sort T periods before the shock
if T < Ta. The only possible play is then repeated defection. The condition
µi < µ
T
a is equivalent to T < Ta, provided beliefs µi replace the prior λ in
the definition of Ta. Lemma 9 implies a player is unwilling to cooperate if he
believes it sufficiently likely his partner is an egoist. The critical value µTa is
decreasing in T , so if µi < µTa holds for some T , then RPS will also have player
i and his partner defect in all later periods.
Beliefs must satisfy µi ≥ 0, so µi < µTa is only possible in all periods if:
d− c > δ
1− δ (1− δ
T0−1)(a+ θ0 − d) (8)
Otherwise a player may cooperate even if he is sure his partner is an egoist,
because the future benefits of rematching with an altruist are so large. The
condition is more likely to hold when discounting is large and when T0 is small.
Since RPS implies the Pareto efficient perfect Bayesian equilibrium of any
subgame, it also implies the Pareto efficient equilibrium for the entire game. I
now show conditions under which RPS is an equilibrium strategy.
Theorem 3. Say (8) holds, and out-of-equilibrium beliefs about a player who
deviates T periods before the shock satisfy µ < µT−1a . Then RPS supports the
Pareto efficient equilibrium of the game as a renegotiation-proof equilibrium.
Proof. By (8), the critical value for µ is strictly positive in any period. By
Lemma 9 and the assumption on beliefs, a player who makes an observed devi-
ation must then repeatedly defect until the shock. That is the harshest possible
punishment, so RPS restricted to any continuation game is an equilibrium strat-
egy.
Renegotiation-proofness does not restrict the possible punishments with
these out-of-equilibrium beliefs. It is therefore equivalent to playing the Pareto
efficient equilibrium in each continuation game, which is what RPS does.
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The renegotiation-proof-equilibrium described above gives one of three out-
comes depending on parameter values. The first is for morale to immediately
drop for all players and remain low until after the shock. The second looks the
same except altruist morale recovers before the shock in the first period where
sorting is possible. The third is for altruist morale to always remain high, and
egoist morale to first stay high then drop in the last period where sorting is
possible.
4.2 Not Allowing for Rematching
The qualitative results from Section 3 still hold if each player must remain with
his initial partner throughout the game. By an identical argument, cooperation
is only possible before the shock if players can sort.
An altruist now has a lower incentive to sort, because he cannot rematch if
his partner turns out to be an egoist. That reduces the expected future benefits
from sorting by a factor λ. He is willing to sort T periods before the shock if:
λb+ (1− λ)d− λ(a+ θ0)− (1− λ)c ≤ λ[ δ1− δ (1− δ
T−1)(a+ θ0 − d)] (9)
An egoist now has a higher incentive to sort because his best deviation is
less attractive. Imitating an altruist only yields benefits if his partner turns out
to be an altruist. He is willing to sort if:
λ[
δ
1− δ (1−δ
T−1)(a−d)+δT−1(b−a)−δ0 δ
T
1− δ (a−d)] ≤ λb+(1−λ)d−λa−(1−λ)c
(10)
The only difference between conditions (9) and (10) and the conditions with
rematching, (3) and (4), is the factor λ on one side of each inequality.
The condition for sorting T periods before the shock remains of the form
Ta ≤ T ≤ Te, but both Ta and Te are now larger. The condition for cooperation
before sorting, (6), remains the same. It comes from an egoist’s incentive to
defect in the last period of cooperation before sorting, which is not affected by
the assumption on rematching.
The qualitative results from Theorem 1 therefore still hold, although the
periods where sorting is possible may differ. A sorting equilibrium will also look
somewhat different, since only altruists who are matched together can cooperate
after sorting. An altruist who discovers he is matched with an egoist will instead
have to defect until the shock.
Differentiating both sides of (9) and (10) shows how changes in parameter
values affect both types’ incentive to sort. Just as before, there are no changes
in parameters that always have an unambiguously positive or negative effect on
morale.
The results are now more robust in terms of renegotiation proofness. Rear-
ranging (9) and substituting µ for λ gives the condition:
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µ ≥ d− c
a+ θ0 + d− b− c+ δ1−δ (1− δT−1)(a+ θ0 − d)
The right-hand side is always positive, since an altruist who knows he is
matched with an egoist will never cooperate. By the same argument as in
Section 4.1, a renegotiation-proof equilibrium exists if out-of-equilibrium beliefs
satisfy the above inequality. Therefore for any parameter values, there are out-
of-equilibrium beliefs such that a renegotiation-proof equilibrium exists.
4.3 Uncertainty About the Shock
Instead of knowing lay-offs will occur at a fixed date, employees may believe
there is a future period where lay-offs are more likely. There might be an
upcoming announcement on firm performance or a discussion of restructuring,
and the uncertainty could also last some time. This section shows that such a
belief will still cause morale to break down, if lay-offs are sufficiently likely.
Assume a shock can occur after any one of periods T0, . . . , T0+N−1 for N ≥
1. The shock occurs with probability p ≤ 1 after any such period, conditional
on in not having occurred before. The set-up reduces to the original model for
N = p = 1.
For morale to break down and the previous results to hold, I must show an
egoist will defect if other players always cooperate. For N = 1 and p < 1, the
condition in period T0 is:
a+ [pδ0 + (1− p)] δ1− δ a < b+ [pδ0 + (1− p)]
δ
1− δ d
since an egoist remains in the game with probability pδ0 + (1− p). That is:
p >
1
1− δ0 [1−
1− δ
δ
b− a
a− d ] ≡ p
1 (11)
Condition 2 implies p1 < 1, so an egoist will defect in period T0 if he believes
the shock to be sufficiently likely.
I now show that a critical value pN exists for any N .
Lemma 10. Say players cooperate in all periods. Then a critical value pN
exists, such that an egoist has an incentive to defect in period T0 if and only if
p > pN .
Proof. See appendix
An egoist’s expected punishment increases if he expects to be in the game in
future periods. That probability is decreasing in p, which implies the existence
of a critical value pN .
I now show pN is decreasing in N . That is, the more periods there are in
which the shock might occur, the less likely it needs to be in any one period to
cause morale to break down.
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Note first that defecting in period T0 gives an expected future loss of (a−d)
per period, taking into account discounting and the probability the egoist will
remain in the game in that period. The future loss is (a− d) times:
N−1∑
i=1
[δ(1− p)]i + δ
N
1− δ (1− p)
N +
δ
1− δ pδ0
N−1∑
i=0
[(1− p)δ]i (12)
The first summation refers to each period T0+1, . . . , T0+N−2, if the shock
has not previously occurred. The second term refers to period T0+N−1 and all
later periods if the shock never occurs. The last summation refers to a period
in which the shock occurs and all later periods.
Lemma 11. The critical value pN is decreasing in N .
Proof. An egoist’s immediate gain from deviating always equals (b− a), so it is
sufficient to show that (12) is decreasing in N . Taking (12) evaluated at N + 1
and subtracting it from (12) gives:
δN (1− p)N + δ
N+1
1− δ (1− p)
N+1 +
δN+1
1− δ (1− p)
Npδ0 − δ
N
1− δ (1− p)
N
Simplifying gives the following, which is negative since δ0 < 1:
δ
1− δ [δ(1− p)]
N (δ0 − 1)
A large value of N means the egoist is more likely to eventually leave the
game, which makes the deviation more attractive. Lemma 11 also implies that
for a given N , an egoist’s incentive to defect is higher in period T0 than at any
later moment. If he cooperates in period T0 and the shock does not occur, he
faces an equivalent situation in period T0 + 1 but with N reduced by one.
The critical value pN is actually decreasing with N at a decreasing rate, and
I now calculate the limit as N tends to infinity. That gives a lower bound on
the value of p that can still cause morale to break down. That is also useful
because it may be difficult or even impossible to derive an explicit expression
for pN .
Lemma 12. As N tends to infinity, the critical value pN tends to:
p∞ =
(1− δ)([ 1−δδ b−aa−d ])
1− δ0 − δ(1− [ 1−δδ b−aa−d ])
Proof. Letting N go to infinity in (12) gives:
δ(1− p)
1− δ(1− p) +
δ
1− δ pδ0
1
1− δ(1− p)
21
δ1− δ
1
1− δ(1− p) [(1− p)(1− δ) + pδ0]
The following condition implies an egoist defects in period T0, and rearrang-
ing completes the proof:
δ
1− δ
1
1− δ(1− p) [(1− p)(1− δ) + pδ0](a− d) < (b− a)
To illustrate the effect of increasing N , say b = 4, a = 3, d = 2, δ = 23 and
δ0 = 13 . Then p
1 = 34 and p
∞ = 12 . The critical value decreases at the fastest
rate for small N , so N need not be extremely large to see a comparatively large
drop in the critical value. With the above parameters, p2 = 0.59.
5 Conclusion
High morale, interpreted as cooperation (productive work) within the team,
can break down if players foresee that an upcoming shock will create turnover.
The paper looks at shocks that are sufficiently large to always cause some type
of drop in morale. Fewer expected future interactions eventually cause egoist
morale to break down, which may in turn trigger a drop in altruist morale.
Altruists will cooperate if others do, but they may begin to defect because of
concern they are working with egoists.
Morale can break down to different extents, and the corresponding equilibria
can be Pareto ranked. The worst case is a complete collapse upon learning
of the shock, which occurs if players cannot sort and reveal their type. An
intermediate case is similar but altruist morale eventually recovers before the
shock. It is only in the best case, where players can sort and there are enough
altruists, that egoist morale remains high for some time and low morale never
spreads to altruists.
Interpreting the shock as lay-offs, I look at steps the firm can take to mini-
mize the breakdown of morale. Seemingly reasonable steps such as targeting the
lay-offs at players who defect or increasing the returns to successful cooperation
can actually hurt morale. They can do so by encouraging egoists to imitate
altruists when they cooperate to later take advantage of them, which can pre-
vent altruists from revealing their type. A sufficiently large change favouring
cooperation will prevent morale from breaking down at all, but small changes
may be counterproductive.
Flexibility, in the sense of letting players choose actions more frequently, can
help morale in two ways. It can reduce the time an egoist takes advantage of a
cooperating partner, which may prevent morale from breaking down at all. It
can also permit sorting by making it possible to act at the precise moment both
types are willing to sort.
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The firm may also prevent a complete breakdown of morale by informing
employees of the lay-offs well in advance. That ensures there is enough value
in future cooperation for an altruist to reveal his type, which favours sorting.
However, informing employees earlier can be risky. If a sorting equilibrium still
does not exist, then morale will still break down and will remain low for longer.
Large lay-offs are particularly bad for morale, but only because they influence
egoist behaviour. Egoists are more less likely to remains with the firm, and
therefore to be punished for any deviation. A larger fraction of altruists can
actually hurt morale if there are strategic complementarities to material pay-
offs, so if b − d < a − c. An egoist’s partner is more likely to cooperate, which
reduces his incentive to defect and sort.
The results are robust in terms of renegotiation proofness, different assump-
tions about rematching, and allowing for uncertainty about the shock.
Low morale could never spread to altruists if they knew each other’s type
at the beginning of the game. The interpretation is that they don’t know each
other’s type because morale was always high before players learned of the shock.
All players cooperated, which was good for efficiency but also means players
never sorted. Altruists remained cut off from private information about each
other, information which could have helped them adjust to the unexpected news
about the shock.
The point is more general. The very characteristic that makes groups effi-
cient can cut them off from information, leaving then unable to adjust to an
unexpected change. Closed groups within organizations can promote trust and
cooperation but may remain isolated from innovative ideas (Burt 2005). Orga-
nizations may develop specific information channels and improve efficiency, but
neglect others and become unresponsive to changes in the environment (Arrow
1974). They may also become dependant on a cooperative network partner and
lack a safety net if their partner unexpectedly exits (Uzzi 1996). This paper
shows members of efficient groups may not only be cut off from important in-
formation about the outside world, but also from important information about
each other.
A firm can inform employees about each other if it can make a clear distinc-
tion between altruists and egoists while times are still good. Egoists may be
willing to accept such a distinction at a low cost, because it will only harm them
during bad times which they do not foresee. Microsoft tried to do just that by
creating a clearly defined group of permatemps (Levin 2002). The permatemps
often worked alongside regular employees, but they could be easily let go if times
got tough. The regular employees could then continue with their work without
suffering a drop in morale.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 7. Altruists are willing to sort when T satisfies (3):
λb+ (1− λ)d− λ(a+ θ0)− (1− λ)c) ≤ δ
1− δ (1− δ
T−1)(a+ θ0 − d)
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Egoists are always willing to sort when T = 1, and for larger T that satisfies (4):
δ
1− δ (1− δ
T−1)(a− d) + δT−1(b− a)− δ0 δ
T
1− δ (a− d) ≤ λb+ (1− λ)d− λa− (1− λ)c
The result holds for Ta = 1 since by definition Te ≥ 1. If Ta is infinite so that (3)
does not hold for large T , then inspection shows that (4) cannot hold either. That
means Te is also infinite.
Say Ta and Te are finite, with Ta ≥ 2. Let T take on the real value such that the
egoist is indifferent about sorting, so where (4) holds with equality. Then (3) holds if:
δ
1− δ (1−δ
T−1)(a−d)+δT−1(b−a)−δ0 δ
T0
1− δ (a−d) <
δ
1− δ (1−δ
T−1)(a+θ0−d)+λθ0
It is sufficient to show the inequality holds for the case θ0 = b− a and δ0 = 0. In
that case it reduces to:
[δT−1 − δ
1− δ (1− δ
T−1)](b− a) < λθ0
which holds because the left-hand side is negative.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let T0 ≥ 2, N ≥ 1, δ = 1 and δ0 = 0. The same argument
would hold for δ < 1 and δ0 > 0 Choose integer T ≤ T0 such that the egoist’s incentive
constraint is satisfied with equality with T periods remaining.
Te = 1 + (1− λ) (a+ d− b− c)
a− d = T
One way to do so is to specify the value of c for any such T :
c = a+ d− b− 1
1− λ (a− d)(T − 1)
This is consistent with a+ d > b+ c, since the last term on the right-hand-side is
strictly positive.
Let  be small and strictly positive, and let θ0 = 2, a = b− . Then:
Te − Ta = (1− λ)a+ d− b− c
a− d −
(1− λ)(a+ θ0 + d− b− c)− (a+ θ0 − b)
a+ θ0 − d
Te − Ta = (1− λ)d− c− 
a− d −
(1− λ)(d− c+ )− 
a+ 2− d
Bringing the terms over a common denominator gives an expression proportional
to . For given N , choose  such that Te − Ta < 1N .
Players are only willing to sort T periods before the shock, since Te = T implies
Ta > T − 1N .
For (i), a marginal increase in a decreases both Ta and Te. Egoists are now only
willing to sort with strictly fewer than T ′ periods remaining. Ta remains strictly larger
than T− 1
N
, so altruists are still unwilling to sort with fewer than T periods remaining.
The only equilibrium is therefore for all players to defect.
For (ii), the new rule cannot sustain complete cooperation if:
δ0 <
1− δ
δ
b− a
a
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An egoist who deviates defects in fewer periods than an egoist who sorts.
If δ0 ≤ λ as well, an egoist who sorts and one who makes the same deviation
as before both leave the game with probability one. That reduces expected pay-off
in each period after by shock by a if an egoist sorts and by d if he deviates, and so
increases the incentive to deviate.
If δ0 > λ, then the pay-off from deviating increases as the probability of leaving
the game is now zero. The pay-off from sorting decreases because the probability
of leaving the game is now higher: 1−δ0
1−λ > 1 − δ0. Once again, deviating is more
attractive.
Proof of Lemma 9.
Rearranging the result from Lemma 5 gives that in the general game, an altruist
is willing to sort T periods before the shock if and only if λ ≥ µTa , where:
µTa ≡
d− c− δ
1−δ (1− δT−1)(a+ θ0 − d)
a+ θ0 + d− b− c
Given that cooperating will yield a + θ0 in all subsequent periods, he will only
cooperate if there is at least a probability µTa his partner will cooperate as well.
Let 0 ≤ µi < µTa and say there are T periods until the shock. I will show that
both player i and j defect regardless of type in period T . The matching rule will then
keep them together and the belief µi will remain unchanged. The condition µi < µ
T−1
a
will also hold, because µT−1a is decreasing in T
′. Player i and j will therefore defect
regardless of type until the shock.
Say player i would defect if he were an egoist. Player j then believes the probability
player i cooperates is less than or equal to µi. Player j must defect if he were an altruist
because µi < µ
T
a . He must then also defect if he were an egoist, since cooperating
would be a dominated action and would also reveal his type.
Player i is therefore sure that his partner will defect. Cooperation is only profitable
for an altruist if there is at least a probability µTa > 0 his partner will cooperate, which
is not the case. So player i will defect regardless of type.
Now say player i would cooperate if he were an egoist. Then he must must also
cooperate if he were an altruist. The belief µi would remain unchanged in the next
period, while the new critical value µT−1a would now be larger. There must be some
period where player i defects if he were an egoist. In that period, µi is lower than
the critical value so both player i and his partner must defect regardless of type by
the previous argument. That means player i would have an incentive to defect as
an egoist in the previous period, and repeatedly applying the argument results in a
contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 10.
An egoist’s expected punishment is increasing in the probability he remains in the
game in future periods. This probability, for some period T0+M − 1 with M ≤ N , is:
(1− p)M + pδ0
M−1X
i=0
(1− p)i
The derivative of this expression with respect to p is:
−M(1− p)M−1 + δ0
M−1X
i=0
(1− p)i − pδ0
M−1X
i=1
i(1− p)i−1
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I now show by induction that the derivative equals −M(1 − p)M−1(1 − δ0) < 0.
Taking M = 1 gives −1(1− δ0). The derivative for M + 1 is:
−(M + 1)(1− p)M + δ0
MX
i=0
(1− p)i − pδ0
MX
i=1
i(1− p)i−1
Using the induction hypothesis, this equals:
−M(1−p)M−1(1−δ0)+M(1−p)M−1−(M+1)(1−p)M+δ0(1−p)M−pδ0M(1−p)M−1
which simplifies to −(M + 1)(1− p)M [1− δ0]
Proof of Lemma 2
A sorting equilibrium does not exist for M = 1. But if τ < 1
M
and δ = 1, then the
incentive constraints for sorting are independent of M :
b
N
+ (1− λ) d
N
− λ (a+ θ0)
N
− (1− λ) c
N
≤ T (a+ θ0 − d)
N
b
N
+ (1− λ) d
N
− λ a
N
− (1− λ) c
N
≤ T (a− d)
N
+
b− a
N
Now say τ > 1
M
. Let k(N) be the smallest integer such that k(N)
N
> τ . Actions are
revealed k(N) periods or time k(N)
N
after they occur. As N increases, k(N) increases
such that k(N)
N
tends to τ .
Choose N sufficiently large so that an integer M exists with Ta <
M
k(N)
≤ Te. Fix
N at such a value and refer to k(N) as k. Note that M ≥ 2k since Te > 2.
Say players pool until M periods before the shock, after which altruists always
cooperate and egoists defect. Players update their beliefs after k periods and then
rematch. An egoist’s equilibrium pay-off in the last M periods is:
kλ
b
N
+ k(1− λ) d
N
+ (M − k) d
N
I now show that it is sufficient to consider the following deviation: an egoist
cooperates for k periods, continues cooperating with an altruist, then defects for the
last k periods before the shock.
If an egoist defects as part of any deviation, then it is optimal to keep on defecting.
Any cooperation will not prevent him from eventually being revealed as a past defector
and punished.
An egoist may deviate by cooperating for the first K < N periods where players
sort. Others initially believe he is an altruist so he matches with an altruist partner
after playing N periods. He then defects for K periods, at which point his initial
defection is revealed. He matches up with an egoist and defects until the shock. The
deviation gives pay-off:
K
N
[λa+ (1− λ)c] + (1− K
N
)[λb+ (1− λ)d] + K
N
b+ (
M
N
− 1− K
N
)d
This expression is linear in K, so it is optimal to choose K = 0 or K = N − 1.
The first case is just the egoist’s equilibrium strategy, and in the second case it is even
better to choose K = N so he is not revealed as a deviant until the shock.
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So the optimal deviation yields:
kλ
a
N
+ k(1− λ) c
N
+ (M − 2k) a
N
+ k
b
N
Multiplying both expressions by N
k
and comparing them gives the incentive con-
straint of the original model but with T replaced by M
k
. The egoist is willing to sort
because M
k
≤ Te.
A parallel argument shows an altruist has no profitable deviation.
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